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Background  
People with psychoses often report fixed, delusional beliefs that are sustained even in the 
presence of unequivocal contrary evidence.  Such delusional beliefs are the result of 
integrating new and old evidence inappropriately in forming a cognitive model. We 
propose and test a cognitive model of belief formation using experimental data from an 
interactive “Rock Paper Scissors” game. 
Methods 
Participants (33 controls and 27 people with schizophrenia) played a competitive, time-
pressured interactive two-player game (Rock, Paper, Scissors). Participant’s behavior was 
modeled by a generative computational model using leaky-integrator and temporal 
difference methods.  This model describes how new and old evidence is integrated to 
form both a playing strategy to beat the opponent and provide a mechanism for reporting 
confidence in one’s playing strategy to win against the opponent 
Results 
People with schizophrenia fail to appropriately model their opponent’s play despite 
consistent (rather than random) patterns that can be exploited in the simulated opponent’s 
play. This is manifest as a failure to weigh existing evidence appropriately against new 
evidence.  Further, participants with schizophrenia show a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias, 
reporting successful discovery of a winning strategy with insufficient evidence. 
Conclusions 
The model presented suggests two tentative mechanisms in delusional belief formation – 
i) one for modeling patterns in other’s behavior, where people with schizophrenia fail to 
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use old evidence appropriately and ii) a meta-cognitive mechanism for ‘confidence’ in 
such beliefs where people with schizophrenia overweight recent reward history in 
deciding on the value of beliefs about the opponent.
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Introduction 
The cardinal features of psychotic illness are the presence of hallucinations (perceptual 
experiences in the absence of an external stimulus) and delusions (fixed false beliefs held 
contrary to evidence and against the prevailing sociocultural milieu). After any novel 
subjective perceptual experience, there is higher order processing that amalgamates 
experience with extant beliefs, or leads to the initiation of a new belief. These beliefs are 
tested in the environment, leading to maintenance or extinction depending on their utility 
(e.g. a belief will be extinguished if it proves to be incorrect and has low utility). 
Therefore, to maintain appropriate (i.e. non-delusionary) beliefs, experienced events 
must be temporally integrated with internal models, tested against the environment and 
then discounted or retained according to feedback from the environment.  When the 
evidence supporting a belief is inconsistent or contrary, the belief is highly resistant to 
revision and is accompanied by a subjective feeling of conviction, it becomes delusional.  
This represents a dysregulation of metacognitive processing, which refers to the 
evaluation of one’s own internal cognitive processes, assigning confidence and utilizing 
this in modifying behavior (Metcalfe et al, 1994; Koriat, 2007) including inferences 
about the behavior and intentions of others (i.e. theory of mind).  Subjective feelings of 
confidence in one’s beliefs can be described in terms of theory-based (e.g. deliberative 
thought and reasoning) or experience-based (e.g. intuitive and unconscious) with the 
latter being the dominant model of human metacognition (Bruno et al, 2012) particularly 
in procedural learning.  Studies examining metacognition in schizophrenia have focused on 
metamemory processes – for example, in (Bacon et al, 2009) participants were shown a 
string of consonants, and asked to prospectively rate the probability of accurately spotting 
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this string among seven distractors after a short interval (“feeling of knowing” rating).  
Patients with schizophrenia persistenly performed worse on actual recall and provided lower 
“feeling of knowing” ratings.  In contrast, retrospective judgements tend to show patients 
with schizophrenia rate higher than controls (Danion et al, 2001; Moritz et al, 2003; Mortiz et 
al, 2006).  Recent evidence suggests that deficits in metacognitive ability, including theory of 
mind, are stable features of schizophrenia (Lysaker et al, 2011) showing little change over 
time.  These deficits in schizophrenia may be underpinned by an inability to integrate new 
information into existing belief systems (Cohen et al, 1996) and the established aberrant 
sensitivity to reward to correct negative beliefs and guide decision making (Fletcher and 
Frith, 2009, Waltz and Gold, 2007). 
 
Existing cognitive accounts of psychotic symptoms suggest that illness arises through a 
mixture of dysfunctional predictive models (Frith and Done, 1989), jumping to 
conclusions (Garety and Freeman, 1999) allied with altered reward processing and 
dopaminergic dysfunction (Kapur, 2003; O'Daly et al 2011).  As a common theme in all 
of these cognitive models, the suggestion is that both perceptual and inferential biases 
contribute to the establishment of psychotic symptoms which are then held with both 
confidence and rigidity, so that these beliefs are difficult to “overcome” even in the 
presence of strong counter-evidence (Blackwood et al. , 2001, Fletcher and Frith, 2009). 
This can be conceptualized in a parsimonious fashion within a Bayesian framework 
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009), where developing beliefs about the world is viewed as a 
probabilistic inference task where old evidence (prior belief) is updated according to new 
experiences or evidence (likelihoods) allowing the derivation of a new “model” of the 
world (posterior beliefs).  For example, when one’s prediction about the world (prior 
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belief) fails to explain or predict some new observation (evidence), there is a “surprise” 
generated by this dissonance (i.e. the event is assigned salience) that triggers updating of 
one’s existing beliefs.  This important process for learning the causes of sensory 
experience is expressed as the dopaminergic-dependent prediction error signal 
(Hollerman and Schultz, 1998) within the striatum; reflecting a mismatch between the 
expectation and incoming sensory input.  An additional factor which is often neglected is 
the questions of our confidence in our beliefs (meta-cognition) about the world. There is 
consistent but counterintuitive data showing the considerable discrepancy between the 
actual probability of certain events occurring, and people’s confidence in the occurrence 
of the same event. 
 
In brief, the missing aspect of contemporary models of psychotic beliefs is the process of 
belief maintenance and failure of abolition. Is there an optimal paradigm to examine this 
in an ecologically valid manner?  Previous studies examining the role of confirmatory 
and contradictory evidence in reasoning and metacognition have tended to focus on high 
level “deliberative” reasoning tasks (Monestes et al. , 2008, Sellen et al. , 2005, 
Woodward et al. , 2006, Woodward et al. , 2008).    However, evidence for a consistent 
deficit in people with schizophrenia using such reasoning tasks is variable (Fletcher and 
Frith, 2009). Those that attempt a more probabilistic explanation (e.g. the “jump to 
conclusion” phenomena) have focused on the beads-counting task, where draws of beads 
from one of two jars each containing a majority of yellow or black beads are undertaken 
sequentially.  Participants decide when they have enough evidence to decide the jar being 
drawn from is the “majority yellow” or “majority black” jar (Garety and Freeman, 1999, 
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Freeman et al. , 2006, Freeman et al. , 2008, Garety et al. , 1991, Huq et al. , 1988, 
Startup et al. , 2008), Such tasks have limited ecological validity, by virtue of the non-
interactive, non-goal directed nature of the experiments (where, for example, the utility of 
beliefs is not crucial to the execution of the task). In order to answer this question, we 
propose an alternative experimental approach based on active interactions akin to those 
we routinely encounter in everyday life.  This approach is exemplified in the behavioral 
economics and game theory literature (Camerer, 1999, Camerer, 2003, Fehr and Camerer, 
2007, Fett et al 2012; King-Casas et al. , 2005, Rangel et al. , 2008) especially in iterated 
competitive games.  Since we are concerned with the participant’s ability to detect, model 
and use regularities in the opponent’s plays we implement a simulated opponent which 
gives the illusion of playing like a “real” opponent, but in fact, presents a statistically 
defined frequency of plays.  We use a modified “rock paper scissors” (RPS) game, where 
new evidence obtained after each trial must be selectively integrated with existing 
evidence in order to update belief and form the basis for future actions.  We suggest this 
represents a “middle ground” between probabilistic inference tasks (e.g. bead counting) 
and the high-level reasoning tasks.   
 
We hypothesize that patients with schizophrenia will differ from healthy controls in i) 
Failure to appropriately integrate new evidence with existing beliefs and ii) when 
evaluating their performance, patients will have excessive confidence in their beliefs.   
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Methods 
Participants 
Twenty seven participants with schizophrenia and thirty three control participants were 
recruited from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust.  Patients had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia based on the DSMIV (APA 1994) and were selected on the 
basis of having current positive symptoms of hallucinations and delusions (greater than 3 
on respective PANNS items) or commensurate levels of positive symptoms documented 
in their clinical records during exacerbations of their illness over the last 5 years.  The 
average chlorpromazine equivalent was 219.8 (+/- 178.6).  Control and patient groups 
where matched on years of formal education.  Full demographics data are presented in 
Table 1.  All subjects were required to give informed consent.  This study was approved 
by the South London and Maudsley and the Institute of Psychiatry 
Research Ethics Committee.   
 
Experimental Design 
Participants were told they would play six RPS games against an opponent via a 
computer interface.  Unknown to the participants, the opponent was a computer program 
(Gallagher et al., 2002, Paulus et al , 2005, Paulus et al., 2004) but with one important 
distinction – in our design, the distribution of computer opponent’s moves are governed 
by a parameterized Multinomial distribution with three different parameter sets that 
define an easy, medium or hard game.   
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In any given game, the computer played randomly (i.e. with no pattern of favored plays) 
for 20 trials then began playing favoring one play for the 40 subsequent trials.  In an easy 
game, the computer switched to an obvious distribution, favoring the same move 
(stochastically) on 80% of the trials with the other two moves being played on the 
remaining 10% of trials respectively.  In a medium game, the computer behaves 
similarly, but favors one move on 60% of the trials, and the other two moves are played 
on 20% of trials. Finally, a “hard” game is one where the favored move is played on 40% 
of the trials, and the other two moves are played on 30% of the remaining trials 
respectively.  The multinomial distribution generating the opponent’s play assumes 
independent trials, so on each trial, the opponent’s play is not dependent on preceding 
trials or participant’s previous plays. Participants played two easy, medium and hard 
games, resulting in a total of six games. 
 
During games, we also probed for participant’s confidence in their beliefs that they had 
found and were able to exploit a “winning streak”. Participants were told that on each 
trial, the winner gained one point and the loser incurred the loss of one point (in 
accordance with a symmetrical zero-sum game).  A draw (i.e. both play rock) results in 
no points for either.  If, at any trial they felt sure they were on a ‘winning streak’, they 
could instruct the experimenter to press a button that would double both their wins and 
losses.  We refer to this as “increasing the payoff” – see section on metacognition and 
confidence below. Participants were told this was an irreversible, one-off decision to 
encourages a conservative approach to doubling their wins and losses.  Participants were 
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given no explicit feedback of their current total score or their performance from previous 
games, forcing them to rely entirely on their own estimates of performance.   
 
On each trial, a count down from three to one preceded a “go” signal.  Participants then 
played their move within one second (using the keyboard) and then simultaneously, the 
computer reveals its move (a photograph of rock, paper or scissors) and the outcome for 
the participant; whether they won, drew or lost.  If participants did not play within a 
second of the countdown ending, they were instructed they were too slow and the trial 
restarted. Each trial had a total duration of 4250 milliseconds. 
 
Prior to commencing the experiment, participants were first trained to use the keyboard to 
indicate their play on each trial.  Each possible play was presented randomly until 
participants response time (e.g. pressing the correct button for rock, paper or scissors) 
decreased below a threshold.  Once participants demonstrated a clear understanding they 
began playing the six experimental games.  In addition, to monitor participants 
engagement with the task (to prevent inattention / distraction), the experimenter sat next 
to and observed the participants.  The experimenter was also responsible for pressing a 
button to increase payoffs on verbal instruction from the participants.  
 
Strategy; action selection 
In the RPS games, participants are expected to build a model of their opponent that 
informs their play.  To do this, they must balance the evidence available to them from the 
history of previous plays as well as weighting new evidence.  In “hard” games, evidence 
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from previous plays is practically redundant, as the opponent plays almost randomly 
throughout the game.  In “easy” games, previous evidence is a reliable predictor of the 
opponent’s strategy, as the opponent will play the same move on a high proportion of the 
trials.   
 
We sought to test whether patients have difficulty correctly balancing or weighting 
existing evidence against new evidence.  The implication of this is that they fail to detect 
and model meaningful regularities in the frequency of the opponent’s play, resulting in a 
poor strategy for winning against the opponent.  This was modeled by a combined leaky-
integrator and temporal difference model (Sutton, 1998). Leaky integration is a key 
feature of neuronal mechanisms for coincidence detection.  An incoming excitatory 
signal stimulates a neuronal population driving its activity upwards.  If another excitatory 
signal arrives within a short time window, the integration process enables the two events 
to be accumulated (reflected by a sustaining or increasing in the activity of the 
population) but if the second or subsequent excitatory signals are too far apart, the 
“leaky” component effectively dissociates them (i.e. the population’s activity falls).  
Similar techniques, such as the diffusion-drift model and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, 
have been used to understand reaction time and accuracy tradeoffs in two-alternative 
forced choice experiments; see (Bogacz et al, 2006) for review.  In our study, the 
participant’s playing strategy is modeled by parallel leaky integrators (one for each of 
rock, paper and scissors), each competing in a competitive winner-takes-all arrangement 
(a softmax function of the activity of three leaky-integrator components) enabling the 
derivation of probabilities and the selection of one of the three plays to be executed on 
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subsequent trials.  The model is updated on a trial-by-trial basis, using two different 
pieces of information (cf. incoming signals) i) new evidence about the current strategy 
with respect to the opponent’s play – this signal represents the temporal difference 
between the predicted outcome of playing an action (i.e. the current state of the strategy 
suggests playing rock will result in a win on the next trial) and actual outcome for a given 
action (i.e. rock was played, but the reward was a loss) ii) a decaying (i.e. leaking) of 
prior expectations based on previous evidence. Rock, paper and scissors all have an 
accumulated history of their utility against the opponent, but this knowledge will decay 
over time unless it is reinforced by continued new evidence in its favour.  These two 
factors are modeled explicitly by two parameters – α models the leaky decaying of 
expectations about utility, and β is the weight given to new evidence.  Figure 1 shows the 
theoretical parameter space and the corresponding playing strategies for the model.  As α 
tends to zero, the model emphasizes the value of expected utility based on previous 
evidence (that is, it discards less prior evidence so one win with a particular move will be 
carried forward for some time).  Conversely, if α tends to unity, then a subject would be 
ignoring all prior expectations from the history of plays (i.e. their play would be 
retrograde amnesic).  One extreme model is represented by α = 1, β = 0 where the 
participant ignores all prior expectations, and gives no weight to new evidence which 
would result in random play.  Further, if α = 0, β = 1, then the model reduces to frequency 
counting, and would approximate a Bayesian model with multinomial likelihood and 
Dirichlet conjugate prior.   
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Importantly, this model does not assume that players explicitly use the payoff matrix 
rationally as would, for example, a model based on fictitious play (Fudenberg, 1995, 
Fudenberg, 1998) or that participants have a statistical model of the a posteriori 
distribution of the strategy as a formal Bayesian model might (Bernardo and Smith, 
2000).  
Meta-cognition; confidence in decision making 
In Figure , we propose that a point-estimate of confidence is derived from the action 
selection / strategy update model (the leaky integrator system described).  Figure 2A 
shows how the decision to increase the payoff may be a function of the output of a 
running history of prediction errors (i.e. the model’s expected reward on a trial given a 
strategy). In this case confidence becomes high when the prediction error becomes 
sufficiently small. This would imply an internal subjective estimate of the expected value 
of actions is being used.  Alternatively, Figure 2B shows how the “absolute” reward 
/payoff may be used (i.e. similar to A, but where the absolute reward (-1, 0 or 1) is used 
instead of the model-derived expected reward).  This would suggest a more objective 
evaluation of rewards (outcomes) received rather than an internal, subjective evaluation 
based on expectation.  This is similar to Actor-Critic models (Sutton, 1998) – while one 
system updates the strategy upon which action selection takes place, another evaluates the 
success of the strategy.  
Analagous to the action-selection model described earlier, the behavior of participants is 
modeled using another leaky integrator model with parameters  and  being the weights 
associated with decaying the previous payoff history and accumulating new payoffs 
respectively (see Supplementary Information for details of implementation).  These 
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parameters are analogous to α and β, where they can vary between extremes of throwing 
away all new information and using only new evidence, and the converse of using only 
old information and ignoring new payoffs. 
Results 
All data analysis was performed using MATLAB 7.3 (MathWorks Inc., Sherbon, MA).   
 
Overall Performance on Games Between Groups 
Patients tended to perform worse than controls in terms of total cumulative score (wins 
minus losses) at the end of a game (Figure 3), across all three levels of difficulty (analysis 
of variance; game difficulty, total score, group; df = 1, F = 12.22, p < 0.0005).  
This difference in performance is not due to poor engagement with the task, as if this 
were the case, patients would perform at the same poor standard irrespective of the game 
difficulty (see Supplementary Information for more detail).  All participants learn the 
pattern quickly in easy games, less so in medium games and as expected, very little 
learning occurs in the hard games.   
 
Model fitting 
Each fitted model was run with the estimated parameters to generate a predicted sequence 
of play for each game, compared to what should have been played to win on each trial 
and averaged.  The model is accurate in predicting the behavior of participants and the 
model fitted both controls and patients equally well (mean log likelihood for controls 
across all games = 0.898; SD = 0.171; mean log likelihood for patients across all games = 
0.936; SD = 0.180).  In terms of the fitted model predicting the participant’s actual 
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actions on every trial, across every game, the fitted models performed best on the easy 
games (as did the participants) with mean correct trial-by-trial model prediction of 0.707 
(SD = 0.149) and 0.600 (SD = 0.203) in controls and patients respectively (where a score 
of 1.0 would indicate each model correctly predicted every trial of every game).  On 
medium games, the model for controls yielded a mean correct prediction of 0.583 (SD = 
0.144) and for patients 0.603 (SD = 0.156).  On hard games (i.e. close to random) control 
models performed at 0.495 (SD = 0.140) and patient models 0.521 (SD = 0.142).     
Further analysis of the performance of the model is given in the Supplementary 
Information.  
 
Between-Group Differences in Strategy 
To assess how participants integrate new evidence with existing beliefs, the parameters α 
and β were averaged within group (controls, patients) as a function of game difficulty.  
An analysis of variance showed that for α, there was an effect of group (patient, control; 
df = 1, F = 10.35, p < 0.002) and also game difficulty (easy, medium, hard; df = 2, F = 
12.96, p < 0.0001) but no interactions of group by difficulty (df = 2, F = 2.55, p = 0.08) 
(Figure 4).  However, there were no significant differences for β.  This result suggests 
that controls and patients use new evidence to a similar degree, but differ in how they use 
existing evidence to influence their strategy. 
 
Patients place less emphasis on expectations based on previous evidence (i.e. α tends to 
one, and they discard previous accumulated evidence more quickly) than controls in the 
easy (one tailed t-test; t = -3.44; p < 0.0004; patients mean α = 0.44; controls mean α = 
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0.23) and medium games (one tailed t-test; t = -2.05; p < 0.022; patients mean α = 0.55; 
controls mean α = 0.43) but not on hard games (where outcomes are most unpredictable).  
This suggests that when meaningful regularities in the frequency of  plays are evident in 
the opponent’s play, the higher value of α causes the estimated utility of each play to fall 
more quickly in patients than in controls.  Thus, patients are unable to temporally “link 
together” events that represent reliable predictors of an opponent’s play. Further analysis 
is presented in the Supplementary Information. 
 
Correlation of Parameters with PANSS Items 
For easy games (where the pattern of play was obvious and exploitable), there was a 
modest correlation between higher values of α and greater scores on the Delusions item 
of the PANSS questionnaire for patients : Spearman’s rho = 0.273, p = 0.045.   
 
Between-Group Differences in Meta-cognition 
To qualitatively explore the decision to gamble on doubling payoffs, games where no 
decisions were made were discarded, leaving 116 and 100 games for controls and patients 
respectively.  Patients exhibited increased confidence (i.e. by doubling payoffs) earlier in 
the games than controls (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test; p < 0.0001; controls mean decision 
at trial 31.46, SD=13.62; patients mean decision at trial 23.77, SD = 16.03).   
 
By averaging the history of payoffs (wins, losses and draws) over the trials directly 
preceding the decision to double the payoff, it was found that participants generally 
experience an “upswing” of around ten trials (Figure 5) of positive reward before the trial 
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on which they make the decision to double the payoffs (see Supplementary Information 
for detailed analysis).  
 
In examining whether internally-derived measures (i.e. prediction errors) or actual 
absolute rewards influence metacognitive assessment, control subjects showed no 
correlation between the trial at which the decision to double-bets was made and measures 
of the average prediction error or average absolute reward in the ten trials preceding the 
decision (r2 =0.068, p>0.05 and r2 = 0.131, p>0.05).  In patients, only the ten-trial 
average of the mean absolute reward showed a correlation with the trial at which the 
decision was made (r2 =0.447, p<0.0001), but not the ten-trial mean prediction error. This 
suggests that a simple correlation-based explanation, where an increasing trend in reward 
rather than punishment predicts confidence judgments will not suffice.    
 
A leaky-integrator model was used, and the parameters  and  found by fitting the 
model to the data by minimizing a quadratic objective function of the time the participant 
made their decision and that predicted by the model for a given estimate of  and  (see 
supplementary information). Using the absolute (rather than prediction error) payoff 
accurately predicted the decision to double payoffs with a mean error of 1.4 trials in 
controls, and 1.6 trials in patients.  The model using the derived prediction error was 
much less accurate ( 9.0 trials in controls, and 15.1 trials in patients). 
 
Interestingly, patients and controls did not differ in the amount by which they decay 
previous evidence () for the decision to double payoffs but patients gave significantly 
Belief and Confidence in Schizophrenia  18 
more weight to new rewards () (t-test; one tailed, patients > controls; p<0.0008; patients 
mean  = 0.51, controls mean  = 0.36). 
Discussion 
We have shown two dissociable mechanisms at work during decision making in 
schizophrenia; one strategically evaluating evidence for and deciding on a specific action, 
and another metacognitive mechanism that acts to assign confidence in the selected 
strategy.  The results demonstrate that patients weight new evidence similarly to controls 
in deciding on their strategy, but they ‘leak’ prior evidence (the alpha parameter) 
preventing efficient action selection, as the temporal patterns from previous plays are not 
incorporated in decision making and they are less able to detect and exploit meaningful 
regularities in the opponent’s play (Gray et al. , 1991).  This was particularly pronounced 
during the easy games, where the pattern of the opponent’s play was more obvious.   
 
Despite their less efficient opponent modeling and action selection strategy, patients still 
exhibit over-confidence when assessing their confidence in their strategy – choosing to 
increase the stakes in the game (they “increase payoff” earlier) – in the face of less 
objective evidence and this is driven by an overweighting of new evidence (the kappa 
parameter)  in the temporal sequence of absolute rewards.   
  
In these patients with schizophrenia, these factors could explain why psychotic beliefs are 
maintained and not extinguished in the face of contrary evidence. In everyday 
interactions with the world, there are a succession of incoming signals, from the 
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environment (i.e. rewards, feedback on performance or observations about other agents) – 
some of which are noise (i.e. random fluctuations) while others represent meaningful 
regularities or associations between events.  These incoming signals must be evaluated 
for their utility (expected value) and temporally integrated when appropriate (for 
example, when these utilities are congruent with the consequences of actions in the 
environment) and discarded (leaked) when they represent meaningless coincidences.  
Furthermore, the meta-cognitive task of evaluating confidence in one’s beliefs about 
strategy is skewed in favour of more recent events and their confidence model fails to 
filter out any sporadic random runs of success. 
 
Theories of Belief 
Our model frames these cognitive processes (modeling the environment by detecting 
meaningful regularities in events, action selection and confidence) in a simple, 
parsimonious model which is computationally plausible, and driven by the mechanisms 
by which neuronal populations integrate incoming signals in the temporal and spatial 
domains.  The RPS game in this study naturally lends itself to a theory of belief 
representation in terms of mapping observable stimuli to actions via an internal 
representational scheme based on probabilistic representations.  This contrasts to formal 
epistemological theories of belief representation (Hintikka et al, 2005) where the beliefs 
are defined in terms of theorem-based manipulations over symbolic propositions or 
predicates in the “language of thought” (Fodor, 1998).  For example using Bratman’s 
(1987) theory of practical reasoning, playing the RPS game would be formulated as 
inferences over sets such as (C,O)→A, where O enumerates the most recent play by the 
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opponent, C is a finite set of contexts (e.g. enumerations over the set of opponent players 
such as an “easy” or “difficult” opponent) and A enumerates the plays available to the 
participant.  This latter approach to modeling belief, particularly as applied to the 
dynamic processes underpinning belief and delusions, has yet to be evaluated.  It can be 
argued that formal epistemological theories capture the explicitly “linguistic” and 
propositional nature of belief (e.g. “The opponent is a cheat”) whereas our probabilistic 
approach represents an implicit, action-oriented and bounded rational interpretation of 
“belief”.  We propose that the dynamic, adaptive cognitive processes underpinning belief 
formation are best studied using such implicit action-directed approaches.  
 
Our model posits that this failure of modulation by context is a function of the ‘leaky’ 
component of our model.  If discrete units of evidence are allowed to ‘leak-out’ too 
quickly, then information about meaningful temporal sequences will never be correctly 
associated together and no reliable evidence will be available for the higher levels of the 
hierarchy (i.e. those responsible for maintaining or abolishing beliefs, and meta-cognitive 
systems that evaluate performance).  
 
Theories of Metacognition  
Theories of metacognition span two axes: “Monitoring/Control” or “Control/Monitoring” 
models (Koriat and Ackerman, 2009) and the “information/theory based” or “experience-
based” (Koriat, 1997).  A third position in metacognition is represented by Theory of 
Mind (Koriat and Ackerman, 2009) where stored representations of mental state 
(combined with rules of inference relating these stored representations to observable 
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behavior) allow an individual to predict others intentions.  Our model and experimental 
results suggest two parallel processes; the judgment of how well one is performing 
(evidenced by the metacognitive act of “doubling” bets when confidence reaches a 
threshold) appears to be better predicted by temporal changes in absolute reward rather 
than depending on measures derived from the “control” (action selection) process.   
 
When confidence is directly derived from the internal action-selecting mechanism 
(suggesting one integrated system) we are unable to predict control’s and patient’s 
performance in increasing the stakes of the game by doubling payoff. But, for both 
groups, this performance can be predicted from absolute reward/payoff signals. The 
confidence process can be viewed within the standard actor-critic model, where one 
implicit mechanism is “fast and dirty” for driving trial-by-trial behavior and another 
“critic” evaluates the performance of this system cf. the proposed sequential 
Monitor/Control or Control/Monitor (Koriat and Ackerman, 2009).  Patients consistently 
made decisions earlier than controls, with more limited information, and indeed, in our 
model, this was reflected by a higher weighting for new (more recent) rewards rather than 
previous history. This is analogous to the over-attribution of evidence observed in the 
‘jumping to conclusion’ bias in the beads task and similar experiments (Freeman et al. , 
2008, Speechley et al. , Woodward et al. , 2009), and is consistent with the observation 
that people with schizophrenia have poor self-assessment of their own performance and 
functional status (Bowie et al. , 2007). In our task, we attempted to study the dynamic 
process underlying the decision rather than manipulating experimental conditions that 
define probabilities of the likelihood (new evidence) and prior (old or accumulated 
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evidence). This probe of meta-cognitive ability emphasizes “output bound” performance 
(Koren et al. , 2006, Koren et al. , 2004) where self-monitoring, evaluation and 
commitment to one’s own behavior is based on a model of the world (i.e. beliefs about 
interactions with other agents) and directed toward behavior.  This is in contrast to what 
Koren and colleagues (2006) describe as “input-bound” measures (such as in beads 
counting tasks) where the problem is framed such that participants make assessments of 
input probabilities, forcing participants to commit to a response.  
 
Relationship to Monoamine Theories of Schizophrenia 
The metacognitive results of our study and model are explained by the pre-synaptic 
hyper-dopaminergic state found in schizophrenia (Howes et al, 2012) – with increased 
response to positive feedback (Pessiglione et al., 2006) that may drive abnormal salience 
responses in schizophrenia (Kapur, 2003, Kapur et al. , 2005).  However, striatal hyper-
dopaminergia alone cannot explain the findings in the patient’s action-selection strategy.  
Our model predicts poorer temporal integration in people with schizophrenia.  This can 
be explained by “context-processing” deficits in schizophrenia (Barch and Ceaser, 2012).  
Here, “context” refers to appropriate online maintenance of representation of probable 
opponent play to enable action selection of counter-plays.  It also requires filtering of 
irrelevant stimuli (i.e. moves by the opponent which do not concord with the emerging 
dominance of their preferred move).  Prefrontal D1 and D2 neurons have been proposed 
to operate in dual-state networks - when these networks are driven by D1 activity, e.g. by 
experimental D2 blockade (Mehta et al, 2004), stable working memory formation 
dominates, with irrelevant stimuli being filtered but with poor context-switching and 
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response flexibility (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).  In contrast, D2 dominated activity 
favours flexible response selection while sacrificing filtering of temporally intervening 
irrelevant stimuli (Durstewitz and Seamans 2008, Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).   
 
Friston  et al (2002) have suggested that higher levels of a cortical hierarchy provide 
contextual guidance to lower levels of processing based on a prediction of inputs and that 
these are modified in the presence of a mismatch – this does not occur in patients with 
schizophrenia.  This failure to modify prior belief in the presence of new evidence is 
supported by an extensive literature demonstrating this for example, in visual processing 
of hollow mask illusions (Schneider et al. , 2002), and their neural correlates (Dima et al. 
, 2009). Other modalities such as event related potentials in processing discrepant 
information (Debruille et al. , 2007), impaired stimulus evaluation (Doege et al. , 2009) 
and our own work on predictive models distinguishing self and other (Shergill et al. , 
2005; Simons et al 2010) suggest that top-down modulation in the integration of evidence 
is dysfunctional in schizophrenia.  
 
In conclusion, patients with schizophrenia demonstrate metacognitive changes which lead 
them to a jumping to conclusions bias, making decisions on the basis of insufficient 
evidence, driven by selective over-weighting of recent rewarding events, rather than a 
carefully balanced assessment of recent successes and failures over time. This data 
supports a model of psychotic symptoms, concordant with a hyperdopaminergic state, 
which gives rise to the salience of aberrant perceptions linked to abnormal beliefs. These 
may occur transiently in a significant proportion of the general population (Smeets et al. 
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2012). However, the reason these beliefs are not extinguished in the face of contrary 
information is because there is a failure of the normal mechanism for integrating evidence 
in the presence of meaningful temporally ordered events; this deficit is compounded by 
the changes in metacognitive processing, giving an inappropriately higher weighting to 
absolute rewards from the environment.  Further work is required to disassemble the 
relative contribution of neural networks responsible for aberrant “leaking” of evidence.  
This data tentatively supports current therapeutic approaches that encourage efficient 
decision making through cognitive remediation where patients are encouraged to make 
explicit judgments during stepwise reasoning.  Given that improving both positive 
symptoms and cognitive dysfunction independently have good predictive value for long 
term outcomes (Bowie et al. , 2006), further translation of experimental cognitive 
approaches focusing on serial decision making is warranted.   
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Figure Legend 
Figure 1 – Parameter space for the action selection model 
This diagram illustrates how strategy is updated based on differences between predicted 
and actual outcomes during different types of play where α models the decaying of prior 
evidence, and β is the weight given to new evidence. 
Figure 2 – Performance evaluation models 
This model demonstrates the strategy for each player over successive trials, where 
evidence for participants to confidently double payoff is derived from (a) prediction 
errors or separately, (b) from the absolute reward/payoff.   
Figure 3 – Average final scores on easy, medium and hard games 
For each game, one point was gained when a subject won a trial or deducted if they lost 
the trial; no points were deducted for draws.  This plot shows the final average scores 
across the difficulty level of each game, e.g. easy, medium and hard.  Controls are shown 
with the dark dashed line and patients with the grey solid line.  Error bars +/- 1 standard 
error. 
Figure 4 – Model parameters across easy, medium and hard games 
For each level of difficulty, easy, medium and hard, alpha models the decaying of prior 
evidence, and beta represents the weight given to new evidence by each subject. Controls 
are shown with the dark dashed line and patients with the grey solid line.  Error bars are 
+/- 1 standard error. * significant diff. p < 0.0004; ** significant diff. p < 0.022. 
Figure 5 – Mean outcome (reward/payoff) in trials preceding the decision to double 
payoffs (confidence);  
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The two histograms show a characteristic “upswing” where mean payoffs are increasing 
positive (i.e. wins greater than losses) over a time window of approximately 10 trials 
before the decision was made to “double bets”.  
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Tables 
 Patient group 
(N = 29, Male = 25) 
Control group 
(N = 33, Male = 23) 
 Mean (s.d.) Range Mean (s.d.)  Range 
Age (years) 40.8 (+/- 8.4) 24-60 34.9 (+/- 14) 18-59 
Years in Full 
Time Education 
13.3 (+/- 3.3) 10-21 11.95 (+/- 2.4) 9-20 
Total PANSS 
score 
54.1 (+/- 11.9) 37-80   
  Positive 13.7 (+/- 5.4) 7-27   
  Negative 13.6 (+/- 4.0) 7-22   
  General 27.2 (+/- 6.0) 18-41   
Medication 
(Chlorpromazine 
equivalent mg) 
219.8 (+/- 
178.6) 
0-600   
Table 1 : Patient and Control Demographics 
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Supplementary Information 
Action Selection Model 
 
We formulated a model based on a strategy vector A, with elements ai representing weights associated with 
actions with i = {1,2,3} indicating rock, paper and scissors respectively.    To derive a strategy At we use a 
general trial-by-trial update of the form: 
T)1( 1   tt AA  (1) 
Where α is a parameter that decays existing evidence in the strategy vector A, and β is the weight assigned 
to new evidence; T is the function used for updating the strategy A with new evidence and is given by: 
  tttttt rr SSAS )(,T   (2) 
Where payoff received at time t is rt and St an indicator vector for what the subject played (for example, St 
= (0,1,0) indicates the participants played “scissors” at time t). 
 
From equation (1), action selection proceeds by generating a distribution over A at time t using the softmax 
rule so that the participant’s probability of playing i is given by: 
 
 


3
1
,
,
,
exp
exp
k
tk
ti
ti
a
a
d


 
(3) 
where Atia , and   is the inverse temperature. 
 
This model combines leaky-integrator and temporal difference models1 so that the participant’s strategy is 
updated based on the difference between the predicted outcome (from the strategy A) and actual outcome 
obtained on a trial and this new evidence is combined with a “memory” for previous trials.  This method 
does not assume that players explicitly use the payoff matrix rationally. 
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Maximum Likelihood Model Fitting  
 
The model parameters (α, β) were fit by maximizing the likelihood of the data given the model parameters.  
The log of the likelihood function was computed on a per-game basis as follows: 
   
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Where di,t, si,t are the output of the model (equation 3) and the participant’s choice on trial t respectively 
(i.e. the data, S).  The models were fit using MATLAB’s fminsearch implementation of the Nelder-Mead 
simplex algorithm over g. 
 
The empirical learning behavior of participants is given in Supplementary Figure 1 below, with the 
model’s predicted performance analyzed similarly in Supplementary Figure 2.  The model provides a 
good fit (both quantitatively and qualitatively). 
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Supplementary Figure 1.  Participant’s average learning    
Plots for the participant’s average learning in easy, medium and hard games expressed as probability of choosing the 
correct play to win on each trial. Controls: Black line, Patients: Grey line.  Error bars are +/- 1 standard error.  Using the 
mean of each participant’s probability of choosing the correct play over the last 5 trials as an estimate of end-point 
learning, patients generally learn less well than the controls on easy (t-test, p < 0.1-6 , controls mean probability correct = 
0.705, patients = 0.596) but not in medium (t-test, p = 0.261) and hard games (t-test, p = 0.304). 
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Supplementary Figure 2.  Model predicted learning 
Plots for model predicted learning in easy, medium and hard games, expressed as probability of choosing the correct play 
to win on each trial. Controls: Black line, Patients:Gray line.  Error bars are +/- 1 standard error.  The goodness of fit of the 
model was measured by grouping the log likelihoods for all games (controls, patients), and a one-way ANOVA (controls, 
patients by average log likelihood) revealed no significant difference between groups, indicating the model fit patients and 
controls equally. 
 
Model Fit as Correct Prediction of Participant’s Play 
 
The model fitting and corresponding goodness of fit measure (equation 4) uses the output distribution given 
by equation 3 and results in an average log likelihood fit to data (over each group; participants with 
schizophrenia, and controls).  
 
Alternatively, we present a residual error measure based on the proportion of actual trials where the model 
made the same predicted play as the participant.  Such an approach heavily penalizes distributions from 
equation 3 scoring a ‘correct trial’ as 1 if and only if the model predicts the actual play (rather than giving 
credit if the model produced a distribution close to the actual participants’ play). 
 
As before, let di,t, si,t be the output of the model (equation 3) and the participant’s choice on trial t 
respectively.  We define the mean number of correct trials in T total trials as: 
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This residual error measure shows for the control group, a mean correct model prediction of 0.595 (SD = 
0.17) and 0.544 (SD = 0.18) for patients (where a score of 1.0 would indicate each model correctly 
predicted every trial of every game). 
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Confidence / Double Payoff Decisions 
 
A similar approach was taken for modeling the participant’s decision to double the payoff.   Let xt be the 
accumulator favoring the decision to double the payoff matrix, and the parameters  and  be the weights 
associated with decaying the previous payoff history and accumulating new payoffs.  Then, the update rule 
for the accumulator is 
Pxx tt   1)1(  (5) 
where P is defined as follows for absolute payoff (Figure 2A) 
t
abs rP
t
  (6) 
and for the “internally derived” prediction error (i.e. the absolute payoff minus the predicted payoff given 
by each element of A; (Figure 2B) 
)( ,tit
pred ArP
t
  (7) 
The decision to double payoffs is the trial tp at which tx where  is a threshold constant chosen 
arbitrarily at 0.8. 
 
The model was fit to each game using the Nelder-Mead algorithm (fminsearch function in MATLAB) to 
minimize a quadratic objective function of the time the participant made the decision to double payoffs, td, 
and that predicted by the model, tp: 
   2,, dppd ttttO   (8) 
 
The two parameters governing the decision ( and ) are shown below in Supplementary Figure 3.   
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
Supplementary Figure 3.  Decision to double payoffs  
Plots for the decision to double payoffs : (a) Decay old rewards parameter (); (b) Weight new rewards parameter ().  
Patients mean  = 0.51, Controls mean  = 0.36.  (one tailed t-test, patients > controls; p<0.0008) 
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